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Abstract 
Given that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter and its emissions continue 
to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization, there is no disagreement 
that China eventually needs to take on binding greenhouse gas emissions caps. However, 
the key challenges are when that would occur and what credible interim targets China 
would need to take on during this transition period. This paper takes these challenges by 
mapping out the roadmap for China’s specific commitments towards 2050. Specifically, I 
suggest that China make credible quantified domestic commitments during the second 
commitment period, commit to voluntary no lose targets during the third commitment 
period, adopt binding carbon intensity targets during the fourth commitment period, and 
take on binding emissions caps starting the fifth commitment period and aimed for the 
global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050. These proposed commitments 
should be viewed as China’s political commitments, not necessarily China’s actual 
takings in the ongoing international climate change negotiations, in order to break the 
current political impasse between developed and developing countries. It is worthwhile 
China considering these political commitments either on its own or through a joint 
statement with U.S. and other major countries, provided that a number of conditions can 
be worked out. These commitments are principles, and still leave flexibility for China to 
work out details as international climate change negotiations move on. But in the 
                                                 
1 Prepared for International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 
Springer, Special Issue (Guest Edited by Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti) on 
Reconciling Domestic Energy Needs and Global Climate Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities for China and India. The views expressed here are those of the author, and 
do not reflect the positions of his affiliations. The author bears sole responsibility for any 
errors and omissions that may remain. 
meantime, they signal well ahead that China is seriously committed to addressing climate 
change issues, alleviate, if not completely remove, U.S. and other industrialized country’s 
concerns about when China would get in, an indication that the whole world has long 
awaited from China, help U.S. to take on long-expected emissions commitments, and 
thus pave the way for reaching an international climate agreement at Copenhagen. 
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1. Introduction 
In addressing climate change issues, China and India are always put together as the big 
emerging economies. There are similarities between the two most populous countries, but 
there exist substantial differences between them. Such differences imply that China needs 
to come prepared to take on even more stringent greenhouse gas emission commitments 
and correspondingly to bear the higher compliance costs than India does. Let me to 
explain why. 
 
Both China and India heavily rely on coal to fuel their economies, but coal accounts for a 
much larger share in China’s energy mix than that of India. As the world’s largest coal 
producer and consumer, China produces and consumes about twice as much coal as the 
U.S., the world’s second largest producer and consumer. Coal has accounted for over 
two-thirds of China’s primary energy consumptions for several decades. Coal-fired 
power plants dominate total electricity generation in China, consuming over half of the 
total coal use. As a result, China’s total installed capacity of coal-fired power plants is 
more than the current total of the U.S., the United Kingdom and India combined.   
 
Both countries have experienced spectacular economic growth over the past two decades, 
but China has grown and is projected to continue to grow faster than India for quite some 
time to follow. Economic structure differs significantly between the two countries. In 
comparison with other countries at its income level, China has an unusually large share of 
energy-intensive industrial production and an unusually small share of less energy-
intensive service sector. For example, 48% of China’s GDP in 2006 originated from the 
industry sector and 40% from the service sector, while the corresponding figures for India 
are 28% and 55%, respectively. Moreover, the differing composition of industry affects 
the levels of energy intensity. China has a larger share of energy-intensive manufacturing 
in industry than that in India, with manufacturing contributing to 33% of China’s GDP in 
2006 relative to the corresponding 16% for India (World Bank, 2008). Thus, China uses 
more energy per unit of industrial output, although the unit energy consumption for major 
industrial products in China is lower than in India (Zhang, 1995 and 1997). As the 
workshop of the world, a hefty chunk of China’s emissions are embedded in goods that 
are produced for exports to industrialized countries. 
 
China is the world’s most populous country, and has experienced a very low rate of 
population growth through implementing its strict family control programs. By contrast, 
the world’s second most populous country grows at a much higher rate than China does, 
and is expected to take over China before 2030 (UNDESA, 2009).2 
All the factors combined lead to that both China’s total and per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions are much higher than India’s. This gap between China’s per capita CO2 
emissions and India’s is projected to even widen in the future. By 2030, China’s per 
capita carbon emissions are projected to be well above the world’s average under the 
                                                 
2 UNDESA (2009) projects that China’s population would peak at 1462.5 millions 
around 2030, while India’s population would be projected to be at 1484.6 millions in 
2030 and further to grow to 1613.8 millions in 2050. 
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business as usual scenario, whereas the corresponding India’s are expected to be below 
the world’s average. The Indian Climate Change Ambassador Shyam Saran was quoted 
as saying that “India is not at the same level as China”. Saran argued that simply 
categorizing India as the world’s third largest emitter “masks the fact that between No. 1, 
No. 2 and No. 3, there is a huge gap” (ClimateWire, 2009). India proposed basing future 
commitments on per capita emissions. This would potentially lead to differentiation 
between China and India and among developing countries because China would fall into 
a more demanding emission reduction category than India. So, if both countries were 
required to cut their emission levels to the world’s average on a per capita basis, then 
China would experience higher compliance cost than India. 
Indeed, If China’s energy use and the resulting carbon emissions had followed their 
trends between 2000 and 2020, during which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP 
with only a doubling of energy consumption, rather than surged since 2001, then 
international climate debate on China would now be much different. On the trends in the 
1980s and 1990s, the U.S. EIA estimated that China’s CO2 emissions are not expected to 
catch up with the world’s largest carbon emitter by 2030 (EIA, 2003). However, China’s 
energy use had surged since the turn of this century, almost doubling between 2000 and 
2007. Despite similar rates of economic growth, the rate of growth in China’s energy use 
during this period (9.74% per year) has been more than twice that of the last two decades 
in the past century (4.25% per year) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). This 
is mainly because China is still in the course of rapid industrialization and urbanization, 
which in turn requires to consume energy to produce energy-intensive steels, cements, 
glasses etc for cars, buildings, houses and public infrastructures, and partly because 
China failed to keep the expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under 
control and to implement its own set industrial restructuring and sustainable development 
policies. 
 
While China should take the main responsibilities for this, the U.S. factor has also played 
a role here. To see why, let us go back to international climate negotiations prior to Kyoto 
and subsequently until the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Prior to Kyoto, 
developing counties’ demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership and the EU 
proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases below 1990 
levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which led the world in greenhouse gas 
emissions at that time. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. The 
Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. economy 
would not be disrupted unreasonably. This may give the U.S. some “moral” right to 
persuade developing countries to take meaningful mitigation action. After Kyoto, the ball 
was kicked into China’s court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key developing 
countries, including China, on board had been and would continue to be its focus of 
international climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it will be 
countries like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make 
some kind of commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. The world’s 
media will undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which will be seen 
as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly even be 
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blamed for “blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing 
countries’ commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public 
pressure on China had put China in a very uncomfortable position.3 It looked like China 
would be pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China wished. 
 
This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 not only led current U.S. emissions to be 
well above their 1990 levels and the world to lose 8 years of concerted efforts towards 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, but also removed international pressure on 
China to take climate change mitigation actions when the Chinese economy is growing 
rapidly. It is since 2001 that China reversed a decline trend in its energy intensity over the 
last two decades in the past century, experiencing faster energy consumption than 
economic growth. It would be silly to blame this for the U.S., but if the U.S. would not 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, for its own competiveness concerns alone the U.S. 
would keep pressuring on China just like it did immediately after Kyoto and is currently 
doing, China’s actual greenhouse emissions would be lower than its current levels.  
 
After what is viewed as eight years of lost time under President Bush, the U.S. is now 
determined to fully engage with international community to seal a global deal to succeed 
the Kyoto Protocol late this year. However, as argued in Zhang (2009a), I seriously doubt 
that developing countries will go beyond the defined policies and measures before 2020 
for several reasons. 
 
First, given the very short timeframe to conclude the negotiations, it would be impossible, 
in all likelihood, to agree on the levels of ambitions for developing countries, on the 
countries and sectors covered, and on the specific rules, especially due to the amount of 
the data that would be required. Second, it is inconceivable that developing countries 
                                                 
3 Under these circumstances and in anticipation that the U.S. would take on the more 
stringent commitments in the post-2012 period, I envisioned a decade ago the following 
six proposals that could be put on the table as China’s plausible negotiation position. 
“First, China could regard its active participation in CDM as ‘meaningful participation’. 
Second, China could commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas 
emissions growth at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Third, 
China could to make voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. 
Policies and measures might need to be developed to explicitly demonstrate whether or not 
China has made adequate efforts. Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to 
total greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. 
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a 
particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, 
although already burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage 
from the sector to those sectors whose emissions are not capped. This leads to the final 
option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon intensity level with an 
emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020.” (Zhang, 
2000).  
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would ever go beyond the aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 without 
an effective financial mechanism. The pledged funding under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol represents only a small percentage of the anticipated mitigation and adaptation 
needs of developing countries (Zhang, 2009a). Unless this funding situation changes 
significantly, which is not likely to happen, developing countries cannot afford to make 
commitments beyond defined policies and measures. Third, the U.S. factor will continue 
to play a role in affecting developing countries’ willingness to take on commitments and 
the stringency of these commitments. The U.S. House of Representatives Energy and 
Commerce Committee recently approved the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 that would cut U.S. carbon emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020. Now this 
bill must proceed through several more committees, before it reaches the full House of 
Representatives for a final vote. It is uncertain whether it becomes law by the end of this 
year. Even if it became law, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 would at best be kept 
at their 1990 level. This is far from the drastic cuts in emissions developing countries 
would expect before taking on their own commitments.  
 
While it would be desirable if the U.S. could commit to a 25-40% cut as called for by 
developing countries, having the U.S. to commit quantified emissions cuts matters most 
to the Copenhagen talks, because the U.S. commitment to cut emissions is deemed 
essential to a global pact. Whether such commitments would timely emerge rests with the 
U.S. Congress. Understandably, in the course of debating and voting the aforementioned 
Waxman-Markey bill, the U.S. Congress will push for major emerging economies and 
even use the threat of trade measures, such as carbon tariffs,4 to induce developing 
economies, such as China and India, to go beyond the defined policies and measures as 
demonstrated when the U.S. Senate debated the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act 
in 2008. The senior officials under the Obama administration signal that the U.S. is not 
going to change its suggested emissions cuts for 2020,5 which is far below what 
developing countries call for, claiming that that there is a little room. Similarly, there is a 
little room left for developing countries before 2020, although for reasons very different 
from those of the U.S.. Therefore, the key issue is post-2020, not pre-2020. 
 
Not immediately but down the road, if China is persuaded to accept some kind of specific 
long-term commitments comparable to its development stage over time, that will send a 
clear signal to the U.S. Congress that China is seriously committed to addressing global 
climate change. That will reduce U.S. concerns about carbon leakages and 
competiveness, and boost domestic American support for tough climate actions. 
                                                 
4 See Zhang (2008, 2009b) for further discussion on WTO scrutiny of the Lieberman-
Warner type of border adjustment provision.  
5 U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu indicated that Washington was not interested in 
retooling its percentage goal for 2020. He was quoted as saying that “I think that rather 
than debating a few percent, the best thing we can do is to get started as soon as possible” 
(Reuters, 2009b). Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, was quoted as 
saying that signing up for cuts of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 would be “a 
prescription not for progress, but for stalemate” in the U.S. Congress (ClimateWire, 
2009).  
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Consequently, that will help a passage of U.S. domestic climate bill and a ratification of a 
global new deal that would emerge at Copenhagen. Whether you like or not, the political 
reality is that, while U.S. commitment to cut emissions is essential to a global pact, how 
China is doing in that context is a crucial, if not decisive, factor in both determining the 
ambition of that commitment and taking on that commitment.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a realistic date on which China 
would be expected to take on absolute emissions caps. Section 3 envisions what kinds of 
credible interim targets we would expect China to take on during this transition period 
from the second commitment period to taking on binding emissions caps. Section 4 draws 
some concluding remarks. 
 
  
2. When would China be expected to take on absolute emissions caps? 
It is unlikely that China would go from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions 
cuts without passing through an intermediate phase of slowing-then peaking before 
reserving. The key questions are: 1) a realistic date on which China would be expected to 
take on absolute emissions caps in a combination of China’s own assessment and 
international pressure? and 2) what kinds of credible interim targets we would expect 
China to take on during this transition period from the second commitment period to 
taking on binding emissions caps? In this section, I focus on the first question. The next 
section will address the second one.   
 
Around 2030: the timing of China taking on absolute emissions caps 
The timing when China would take on absolute emissions caps needs to take many 
factors into consideration. I think the fifth commitment period (2028-2032), or around 
2030 is not an unreasonably expected date on which China needs to take on absolute 
emissions caps. Understandably, 2030 is later than the U.S. and other industrialized 
countries would like to see, but is not unreasonable. From China’s perspective, it would 
probably be still too soon.  
 
The fourth assessment report of the IPCC (2007) recommends that avoiding dangerous 
climate change consequences would require global greenhouse gas emissions to peak by 
2020 as the latest and turn downwards afterwards. With China already being the world’s 
largest carbon emitter (MNP, 2007; EIA, 2009), the earlier China would take on 
emissions caps, the more likely that goal would be achieved. So, Hu (2009) argues that 
China should mirror this global roadmap, and thus suggests that China’s carbon 
emissions should have peaked by 2020 and be cut to their 1990 levels by 2030. However, 
given that China is a country at low development stage and has coal-fueled, rapidly 
growing economy, its carbon emissions are still on the climbing trajectories. The EIA 
(2009) projects China’s baseline carbon emissions in 2020 to be 4.11 times their 1990 
levels, and to be expected to continue to grow afterwards, climbing to 5.12 times their 
1990 levels in 2030. While energy use in China is projected to grow somewhat slower in 
the 2020s than in the 2010s, non studies have projected that China’s carbon emissions 
would peak by 2030, even if some energy saving policies and measures have been 
factored into such projections. It should thus come as no surprise that Hu’s proposal has 
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received very negative reactions from China’s delegation to the United Nations 
conference on climate change.6    
 
Even if 2020 is considered unrealistic, then what is a realistic date to expect China to take 
on emissions caps? It should be pointed out that before legally binding commitments 
become applicable to Annex I countries, they have a grace period of 16 years starting 
from the Earth Summit in June 1992 when Annex I countries promised to individually or 
jointly stabilize emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases at their 1990 levels by the 
end of the past century to the beginning of the first commitment period in 2008. This 
would point to the first binding commitment period starting around 2026 for China.  
 
While it is not unreasonable to grant China a grace period, delaying the timing of China 
taking on emissions caps beyond 2030 is not acceptable. China is now already the 
world’s largest carbon emitter and is about to take over Japan as the world’s second 
largest economy this year or so, although its per capita income and emissions are still 
very low. With another twenty years of rapid development, China’s economy becomes 
even close to the U.S., and its absolute emissions are well above the second largest 
emitter. The EIA (2009) projects that China’s baseline carbon emissions in 2030 amount 
to 11.73 billion tons of carbon dioxide, relative to 6.4 billion tons for the U.S. This gap 
could become even bigger, provided that the U.S. would cut its emissions to the levels 
proposed by the Obama administration and under the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009. By then, China’s per capita income will reach to the very 
reasonable level and its per capita emissions will be well above the world’s average. The 
EIA (2009) puts the estimated per capita carbon emissions in 2030 at 8.05 tons of carbon 
dioxide for China, relative to the corresponding world’s average of 4.85 tons of carbon 
dioxide. While the country is still on the climbing trajectory of carbon emissions under 
the business as usual scenario, China would have lost its ground not to take on emissions 
caps when the world faces ever alarming climate change threats and developed countries 
have demonstrated significant emissions reductions by then. 
 
What about the transition period to 2030? Developing countries need reasonable time to 
develop and operate national climate policies and measures. Many studies point out the 
structural limitations of CDM, and suggest that if developing countries would take on 
sectoral or absolute emissions caps, then that will move the CDM from a project-based 
mechanism to a wholesale mechanism and allows developing countries to sell emission 
                                                 
6 One member of China delegation to the international conference on climate change at 
Bonn considered his suggestion “irresponsible utopian speeches”, and wrote that “the 
author mentions none of China’s relevant basic conditions in his speech about climate 
change problems. Instead he focuses on empty talk about international fairness and 
justice. The author lacks intrinsic knowledge about how climate change problems have 
appeared and lacks any common sense of history or knowledge of the current situation of 
international politics. Because of this, his conclusions could mislead readers, which is 
irresponsible and without vitality”. Available at: 
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/2892-A-new-approach-at-
Copenhagen-1-. 
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permits at the same world market price as developed countries whose emissions are 
capped, relative to the lower prices that developing countries have received for carbon 
credits generated from CDM projects. However, no institutional and infrastructure 
supports exist in the majority of developing countries for operating emissions trading. 
Developing countries including China need time to develop and operate such a scheme. 
Take the establishment of an emissions trading scheme as a case. Even for the U.S. SO2 
Allowance Trading Program, the entire process from the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency beginning to compile the data for its allocation database in 1989 to publishing its 
final allowance allocations in March 2003 took almost four years. For the first phase of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the entire process took almost two years from the EU 
publishing the Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading on 23 July 2003 to it approving the last national allocation plan for Greece on 20 
June 2005. For developing countries with very weak environmental institutions and that 
do not have dependable data on emissions, fuel uses and outputs for installations, this 
allocation process is expected to take much longer than what experienced in the U.S. and 
the EU and put a trading scheme into operation (Zhang, 2007a). That is the reason why I 
suggest to have voluntary no lose targets during the third commitment period (2018-
2022), instead of immediately having such targets during the second commitment period. 
That will leave some time for developing countries to design and implement an emissions 
trading scheme which economists argue that developing countries would benefit from. 
 
Another timing indicator is a lag between treaty signing and budget period. With the 
Kyoto Protocol signing in December 1997 and the first budget period staring 2008, the 
earliest date to expect China to introduce binding commitments is 2020. Even without the 
precedent for Annex I countries, China’s demand is by no means without foundation. For 
example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer grants 
developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the scope of 
economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger 
than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, in my view, there should be a grace period 
of much longer than 10 years for developing countries after mandatory emission targets 
for Annex I countries take effect. In the meantime, absolute emissions caps on 
developing countries need to be markedly below their baseline levels by 2030. We think 
that one way to ensure this is China committing to binding carbon intensity targets during 
the fourth commitment period (2023-2027). 
    
 
3. A Roadmap for China to 2050 
In what follows, I will discuss in what format and under what timeframe China would be 
included in a post-2012 climate change regime. I envision that China would need the 
three transitional commitment periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on 
absolute emissions caps. 
 
Credible quantified domestic commitments during the second commitment period 
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China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy saving and the use of 
clean energy (Zhang, 2009c), and has got credit for such efforts.7 China should extend its 
level of ambition, further making credible quantified domestic commitments to energy 
saving and the use of clean energy for the second commitment period. Such commitments 
include but are not limited to continuing to set energy-saving and pollutant control goals 
in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as challenging as the current 
11th five-year (2006-2010) blueprint does, increasing investment in energy conservation 
and improving energy efficiency, significantly scaling up the use of renewable energies 
and other low-carbon technologies, in particular wind power and nuclear power, and 
providing additional support policies to accomplish its own ambitious energy-saving and 
clean energy goals. Currently, China has set to decommission thousands of small, 
inefficient coal-fired power plants with a unit capacity of 50 MW or less. To the benefits 
of energy saving and the environment, China should consider doubling that unit capacity 
to 100 MW below which coal-fired plants need to be decommissioned (Zhang, 2009c). 
 
Calling future goal as challenging as the current one requires to establish why the current 
20% energy saving goal is considered very challenging. China sets the goal of cutting 
energy use per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010, relative to its 2005 level. In 2006, the first 
year of this energy efficiency drive, while China reversed a rise in its energy intensity in 
the first half of that year, the energy intensity only declined by 1.79% over the entire 
year. Although this decline is for the first time since 2003, it is far short of the target of 
4%. Among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent, only Beijing met that energy-saving 
goal in 2006, cutting its energy use per unit of GDP by 5.25%, followed by Tianjin with 
the energy intensity reduction of 3.98%, Shanghai by 3.71%, Zhejiang by 3.52% and 
Jiangsu by 3.50% (NBS et al., 2007).8 In 2007, despite concerted efforts towards energy 
saving, the country cut its energy intensity by 3.66%. There are still big variations in 
energy-saving performance among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent. Beijing still 
took the lead, cutting its energy intensity by 6%, followed by Tianjin by 4.9% and 
Shanghai by 4.66% (NBS et al., 2008). This clearly indicated the Beijing’s commitments 
to the 2008 Green Olympic Games. In the meantime, there were 7 provinces whose 
energy-saving performances were below the national average. With the country’s overall 
performance of the first two years, to meet that national energy intensity target would 
need the energy intensity reduction averaging 5.44% for each of the remaining three 
years. This required energy saving rate is even higher than the annual saving rate of 
5.25% during the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP 
while cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003). Achieving that 
rate will certainly not be easy, if not absolutely impossible.  
 
                                                 
7 Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, was quoted as saying that “The 
Chinese are doing a lot already, …The Chinese have a lot of policy that they have put in 
place” (Reuters, 2009a).  
8 Beijing is the first provincial region in China to establish in 2006 the bulletin system to 
release data on energy use and water use per unit of GDP, quarterly releasing these and 
other indicators by county. See Zhang (2007b and 2007c) for detailed discussion on why 
Beijing met but the country missed the energy-saving goals. 
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Voluntary no lose targets during the third commitment period 
During the third commitment period (2018-2022), China could commit to adopting 
voluntary no lose targets. Such targets are defined as certain percentages of reduction 
from the country’s business as usual emissions. Emissions reductions achieved beyond 
the no lose targets would then be eligible for sale. That will allow China to sell emission 
permits at the same world market price as developed countries whose emissions are 
capped, relative to the lower prices that China has currently received for carbon credits 
generated from CDM projects. 
 
The keys to operate this option involve setting both baseline emissions and no lose 
targets. To avoid inflating baseline emissions, baselines must be generated by an 
independent international expert body, not by the Chinese national authority.9 On setting 
no lose targets, one option is to take the IPCC (2007) recommendation as a reference, 
which suggests that developing countries as a group will need to limit their greenhouse 
gas emissions to 15-30% below their baselines by 2020. Another option is based on 
China’s own set energy or carbon intensity targets, which are then translated into the 
amount of emissions reductions from the baselines. Because having some quantitative 
targets is more critical than targets themselves, the no lose targets for China will be set 
not to exceed the higher of the above two alternatives to encourage China to take on such 
targets.  
 
What is the yardstick or bound on the energy intensity of the Chinese economy in 2020? 
Between 1980-2000, China’s GDP quadrupled, but its energy consumption only doubled. 
China aims to achieve a quadrupling of its GDP with only a doubling of energy 
consumption between 2000 and 2020, with a 20% cut in the energy intensity between 
2006-2010 deemed a crucial step towards that goal. Assuming that China’s economy 
grows at the annual average rate of 7% per year and China is able to limit the growth in 
energy use to half the growth rate of the economy between 2006-2020, then China’s 
energy use per unit of GDP would be cut by 40% by 2020, relative to its 2005 levels. 
This back of the envelope calculation implies the assumed energy elasticity of 0.5 
between 2006 and 2020. While China were able to accomplish that during the last two 
decades of the past century, going ahead, we should not naturally expect a return to that 
level, given that China had experienced faster energy consumption than economic growth 
between 2001 and 2005 and, as discussed earlier, is encountering great difficulty in 
meeting its 20% energy intensity (Zhang, 2005, 2007b,c and 2009c). Thus, a 40% cut in 
China’s energy intensity by 2020 relative to 2005 is considered as an upper bound on 
China’s possible no lose energy intensity targets.  
 
Moreover, reducing China’s baseline emissions below the no lose targets set by either of 
the aforementioned two options involves not only abatement costs, but also the costs 
associated with measurement, reporting and verification requirements that are more 
complex, demanding and thus costly to comply with than China’s own domestic 
requirements. For a huge developing country like China with very weak environmental 
                                                 
9 Frankel (2009) also suggests to use an independent international expert body to set 
baseline emissions in his formulas for emission targets for all countries. 
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institutions and that do not have dependable data on emissions, fuel uses and outputs for 
installations and all reports have to be in English for this purpose, such costs, which 
occur to ensure that all the emissions data are properly measured, reported and verified in 
an aim to generate economically valuable and environmentally-credible credits and thus 
to ensure that an international emissions trading scheme works properly, are not expected 
to be trivial. So, combined this with the above upper bound arguments, China could 
conceivably assume a no lose target less stronger than the one set by its domestic energy 
or carbon intensity targets.  
   
Binding carbon intensity targets during the fourth commitment period 
During the fourth commitment period (2023-2027), China could commit to adopting 
binding carbon intensity targets. This will be a significant step forward towards 
committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment period. In my 
view, carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy 
(i.e., total energy consumption per unit of GDP), because all the efforts towards shifting 
away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former. The carbon intensity is set 
further downwards relative to the third commitment period. 
 
Binding emissions caps starting the fifth commitment period 
Being granted the three transition commitment periods, China would be expected to take 
on binding emissions caps starting the fifth commitment period. The exact caps will be a 
function of many factors. While it would be desirable if China could commit to stringent 
emissions caps, having China to commit quantified emissions cuts is more critical than its 
emissions caps themselves because that will hold China’s emissions on a contraction 
path. In my view, there is no need to worry too much about that emissions caps, given 
that actions to honor the interim targets during the transition periods would have driven 
China’s emissions substantially below their business as usual levels. Thus, that emissions 
caps, no matter what value would be set eventually, would be substantially deviated from 
China’s projected baseline emissions. Moreover, the caps should be set in such a way to 
aim for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050 as recommended by Stern 
(2008).10 Provided that the world would agree on this, it will serve as another way for 
China to carefully set its emissions caps from the fifth commitment period onwards in 
order to avoid overshooting the caps set based on the world’s per capita emissions in 
2050.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Countries from around the world are scheduled to meet in Copenhagen in December 
2009 to try to hammer out a new post-2012 regime for attacking climate change 
problems. No one would disagree the U.S. commitment to cut emissions essential to such 
a global pact and President Obama’s desire to lead after what is viewed as eight years of 
lost time under President Bush. However, much of Obama’s ability to move forward in 
international climate negotiations rests with the U.S. Congress, because the Obama 
                                                 
10 This does not necessarily means that I agree with Stern’s suggested value of the global 
per capita emissions in 2050. 
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administration will likely be in the position to agree to a specific emission target that the 
whole world has long awaited only when the Congress has enacted or is on the verge of 
enacting a legislation capping the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The influential U.S. 
congressmen have frequently stressed the importance of China in helping a passage of 
U.S. domestic, carbon-constrained legislation and a ratification of a global new deal that 
would emerge at Copenhagen. Whether you like it or not, this is a political reality. 
However, both sides see a little room before 2020, although for reasons very different 
from each other. Therefore, the key issue is post-2020, not pre-2020. With the U.S. aimed 
to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 83% from their 2005 levels by 2050, what matters 
most now is U.S. taking on quantified emissions cuts immediately staring the second 
commitment period. The U.S. is unlikely to do that until China is politically willing to 
agree to some measurable, verifiable and reportable goals for greenhouse gas obligations. 
China is also expected to face increasing pressure from the European Union, who will 
find it increasingly hard to convince its citizens in general and the companies in particular 
why the EU has taken the lead but don’t see China to follow. In my view, this is not the 
illegitimate concern, and overall competitiveness concerns mean that no country is likely 
to step out too far in front (Zhang, 2004). That goals that would meet U.S. expectations 
and at the same time, are considered acceptable by China are an open question. But the 
bottom line is that what that goals or obligations would be needs to fully respect China’s 
rights to grow, and should reflect China’s growing responsibility for emitting greenhouse 
gas emissions as the living of standards increases over time. After all, China is a 
developing country right now, no matter how rapidly the Chinese economy is expected to 
grow in the future. On the other hand, China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter 
and its emissions continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization. 
China needs to act as a large and responsible developing country and take due 
responsibilities and to set a good example to the majority of developing countries. 
 
There is no disagreement that China eventually needs to take on binding greenhouse gas 
emissions caps. However, the key challenges are when that would occur and what 
credible interim targets China would need to take on during this transition period. No 
doubt, that will result in a combination of China’s own assessment of responsibility, 
economic and political benefits and of climate change impacts, the give and take of 
international negotiations, and mounting diplomatic and international pressure. Based on 
my educated judgments, this paper maps out the roadmap for China’s specific 
commitments towards 2050. Specifically, I suggest that China make credible quantified 
domestic commitments during the second commitment period, commit to voluntary no 
lose targets during the third commitment period, adopt binding carbon intensity targets 
during the fourth commitment period, and take on binding emissions caps starting the 
fifth commitment period and aimed for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 
2050. With China having very little responsibility for the current climate change 
problems and taking on commitments substantially deviated from its projected baseline 
emissions much earlier than what would have otherwise been, the U.S., the world’s 
richest country and historically largest emitter, has no reason at all not to take on 
quantified emissions cuts immediately staring the second commitment period and to 
commit further stiff cuts by 2050.  
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The proposed commitments should be viewed as China’s political commitments, not 
necessarily China’s actual takings in the ongoing international climate change 
negotiations, in order to break the current political impasse between developed and 
developing countries. They act much like the U.S. presidential campaign commitments 
which are subject to many factors to honor. China would make the proposed political 
commitments conditional on U.S. (and other industrialized countries) commitments to 
immediately taking on quantified emissions cuts and further stiff cuts by 2050, not to 
using the threat of trade or trade measures to China’s products in U.S. approving or 
ratifying any bills, regardless of which are climate-related or international climate change 
agreements until around 2030, and on not expecting/forcing China to change the type and 
timing of commitments as outlined in my proposal. If that can be worked out, then I think 
that it is worthwhile China considering these outlined political commitments either on its 
own or through a joint statement with U.S. and other major countries. After all, these 
commitments are principles, and they still leave flexibility for China to work out details 
as international climate change negotiations move on. But in the meantime, they signal 
well ahead that China is seriously committed to addressing climate change issues, 
alleviate, if not completely remove, U.S. and other industrialized country’s concerns 
about when China would get in, an indication that the whole world has long awaited from 
China, help U.S. to take on long-expected emissions commitments, and thus pave the 
way for reaching an international climate agreement at Copenhagen. 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the value of my proposal is in what format and under 
what timeframe China would be included in a post-2012 climate change regime, not the 
details of particular numerical numbers. China taking on such increasingly stringent 
commitments should not be taken as granted because that requires China to take 
significant efforts towards cutting its projected emissions below the baselines. Political 
reality may limit the U.S. ability to take on significant emissions cuts by 2020 as 
developing countries called for, but as a tradeoff, the U.S. should significantly scale up its 
technology transfer and deployment, financing and capacity building to enable China to 
do that. This is at least what the U.S. can and should do, and by example can encourage 
other developed counties to do the same. As Winston Churchill said, “[you] can always 
count on the Americans to do the right thing – after exhausting every other alternative.”. 
After what is viewed as eight years of lost time, the whole world bets that U.S. will 
disappoint us this time. Only history will tell us whether that will be a case. 
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